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Introduction W ITHIN A broad cultural context involving the convergence of the biological and the technological, one key feature has been the resurgence of Darwinism. Where the particular characteristics of this Darwinism have been vigorously contested (see, for example, Brown, 1999 and Rose and Rose, 2000) , 1 a tacit belief in evolution per se has been at the root of key developments across the boundary of art and science. This article challenges the belief in evolution which has increasingly erased the boundaries between art and science in the particular contexts of artificial life and transgenic engineering. Here, more than elsewhere, there is an almost overwhelming sense of evolutionary possibility, and here more than elsewhere the evolution in question is more technological than biological, more informational than material, more possible than actual. Without seeking to reinforce or to map these dichotomies on to each other, my point is to show how, in these contexts, the complex interplay or dialogue between them is effaced, creating not just a tacit, but a sterile belief in evolution as an abstract process.
The critique of abstract evolution which follows is not a critique of evolution as a whole. Rather, it is part of a struggle which is both internal and external to computer science and to biological and evolutionary theory over the prioritization of form versus matter and over the epistemology and ontology of information. 2 My argument is not that evolution has no role in contemporary life and its various modes of interpretation but that it has been displaced, abstracted and somewhat reified through its attachment to the gene as the fundamental informational unit of life. In the world of abstract evolution, which seems to me to persist even in the face of contestation, it is principally genes which evolve and information which lives. My argument is, then, part a broader defence (Oyama, 1985; Keller, 1995; Haraway, 1997; Hayles, 1999) of the role of the biological within the technological, the material within the informational, the actual within the possible.
The Possible and the Actual
Whether in a social group or in an individual, human life always involves a continuous dialogue between the possible and the actual. A subtle mixture of belief, knowledge, and imagination builds before us an ever changing picture of the possible. (Jacob, 1982: vii) The terms of my critique of evolution are drawn from François Jacob's essays on modern biology and specifically on neo-or genetically informed Darwinism in The Possible and the Actual. 3 Though the terms themselves are not defined or interrogated, 4 they describe, respectively, human attempts to represent and to effect radical long-term biological transformations and the brakes or limitations imposed on them by science, politics, ethics and the imagination. The key point for Jacob is not so much to anchor the possible and the actual to demarcated realms such as myth and science, imagination and reality but to highlight the dynamic between them as it operates, or in the context of neo-Darwinism, fails to operate within and across such realms. The dynamic is that of containment through dialogue and there is or should be a dialogue between the actual and possible across a spectrum of belief, knowledge and imagination. Moreover, this dialogue, by containing the possible within the actual, balances radical and conservative visions of the evolution of biological forms, allowing space for those forms to 'really' change.
For Jacob, the picture of the possible -whether it be 'dogs with fish heads' drawn in 16th-century zoology books or aliens with two legs, two arms and two antennae drawn in 20th-century science fiction comics -has historically been limited by a dialogue with the actual. Monsters, aliens and hybrids have always been strangely familiar; a means of working out 'our desires and fears ' (1982: viii) about future or other lives. In different ways and with different rules, politics, art and science are all ways of conducting this dialogue:
For science, there are many possible worlds; but the interesting one is the world that exists and has already shown itself to be at work for a long time. Science attempts to confront the possible with the actual. It is the means devised to build a representation of the world that comes ever closer to what we call reality. (Jacob, 1982: 12) The problem for Jacob is that science, through the influence of modern Darwinism with its concentration on the evolution and engineering of genes is focusing on the possible at the expense of the actual and so is losing (its) ground. It becomes clear in his writing that this lack of dialogue is of significance not just to the status of science but to the social realm and to questions of politics and ethics. This is the basis of my concern with the evolution of possible life in vitro and 'in silico' (Langton, 1996: 51) : there are, to state it rather bluntly, important political and ethical questions which are effectively sidelined in the hubris that harnessing evolution has generated. This problem, as I see it, is worsened by the equally unseemly rush to disavow responsibility, to look for the loophole in the Faustian law, by re-naturalizing the de-naturalized entities which emerge.
Where genetics, and especially transgenic engineering (the transfer of genetic and other biological material across species 'or even across taxonomic kingdoms, for example, from fish to tomatoes' [Haraway, 1997: 60] ), is generating an industry and an imaginary of novel hybrid entities, the field of artificial life (alife) relocates the quest for artificial intelligence in the simulation and synthesis of computerized or robotic life forms (Kember, 2002) . Through an examination of two works of art which address alife and transgenic engineering respectively -Galápagos by Karl Sims (1997) and Genesis by Eduardo Kac (1999a) -I want to suggest that the possible is not delimited by a dialogue with the actual in these contexts, but rather that it becomes part of what Jacob refers to as the over-extension, the mythologization of modern or neo-Darwinism. Possibility becomes totalized in the name of evolution; a means to no end or an end in itself. It becomes vacuous, empty of meaning, awaiting meaning. Possibility becomes its own pursuit, what Paul Virilio describes as a 'limit-performance' characteristic of a postcold-war technoscience which has lost its purpose, lost its way (2000: 1). Technoscience, in this context fails to see beyond the endless scope of evolutionary possibility and the 'radiant future of transgenic species ' (2000: 145) , like the future of alife's artificial 'autonomous' agents (Maes, 1996 (Maes, , 1997 is an economic vision, a vision of the instrumentalization of life which this particular 'sci-art' fails to challenge.
Jacob's use of the concept of myth is salutary here. On the one hand, it refers to a sterile belief. Darwinism, like 'any theory of some importance is liable to be over-used and to slip into myth.' In explaining too much it ultimately explains very little. Its indiscriminate use invalidates its usefulness and it becomes empty discourse. Enthusiasts and popularisers, in particular, do not always recognise the subtle boundary that separates a heuristic theory from a sterile belief; a belief which, instead of defining the actual world, can describe all possible worlds. (1982: 22) This is precisely the way in which (Darwinian) evolutionary possibility becomes mythical. Moreover, Jacob also refers to myth as 'a story giving the origins and therefore explaining the meaning and purpose of the living world as well as man's place in it ' (1982: 23) . The theory of evolution is one such story, but he also tells of how genetic engineering, by transgressing the laws of nature (and sacred culture) 'conjures up some of the old myths that have their origin in the deepest kind of human anxiety' and which deal with 'the primitive terror associated with the hidden meaning of hybrid monsters, the revulsion caused by the idea of two beings unnaturally tied together ' (1982: 46) . Metamorphoses is the 'old myth' which deals at once with evolutionary possibility and the human anxiety it can provoke. 5 Metamorphoses, from the Greek meta (across, after or between) and morphē (form) is, as presented in a recent exhibition curated by Marina Warner and Sarah Bakewell 6 as much a facet of human nature as human culture. 7 It describes fundamental biological and evolutionary processes of both the self and the species, including the movement of bodies through birth, reproduction, ageing and death and the mutations and selections operating on them over considerable lengths of time (Warner and Bakewell, 2002: 2) . As they see it, the complex and highly evolved human brain has produced and depended on stories, rituals, myths and art, a great deal of which 'return again and again to tales of transformation and creation' (Warner and Bakewell, 2002: 2) . The curators of Metamorphing: Transformation in Science, Art and Mythology set out to universalize metamorphic nature/culture and maintain that 'mythologies all over the world feature the magical shape-shifting of gods and goddesses, and most great religions place metamorphic myths at the centre of their tradition.' So, for example, in Christianity, transformation can be divine or demonic, bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ or Satan's many disguises. In Hindu mythology, the first man and woman transform themselves in order to create all the species of the world (2002: 2). The tales of transformation are transformed across history as well as cultures 'gaining in depth and range' through the encounter with science 'and especially with the theory of evolution'. Here metamorphoses is naturalized; not a reference to shape-shifting but to the 'organic unfolding of forms in time and space' (2002: 2). Darwin's theory of evolution constitutes a set of 'simple metamorphic rules: descent with modification, selection pressure, and adaptation to environment ' (2002: 12) and with the arrival of genetics these rules become 'even more defined, describing the replication and mutation of simple units of heredity ' (2002: 12) . Darwin's metamorphic rules are apparently so simple that they can be replicated in computer techniques such as morphing, in which one form transforms seamlessly into another through various intermediate stages. The exhibition included a computer artwork Origin (1999) by Daniel Lee. Via a sequence of images of mythical amphibians and mammals, Lee morphs or metamorphoses seamlessly from a shapeless originary form to the human form, reinforcing the play of the possible and actual and the conflict between open-ended evolution -'chance' -and the tree of life (with the human species securely at the summit) -'necessity' (Monod, 1974) . This conflict concerning the status of man in relation to animal reveals itself in evolutionary theory through the contested currency of what Mary Midgley calls the 'escalator model', the Lamarckian idea that 'evolution is a steady, linear upward movement, a single inexorable process of improvement' leading to man 'and beyond into some superhuman spiritual atmosphere' (Midgley, 2002: 7) . Though she is keen to contrast this with Darwinian theory, Midgley maintains that there is more than a residual sense of divine order in secular and scientific accounts of metamorphoses from the theory of evolution to various manifestations of modern Darwinism such as artificial life and genomics. This may be said to account for what Warner describes as the 'terrors and pleasures' which attend 'any technological change which undermines our humanity and identity by merging our bodies with animals or with machines, or by taking away our sense of having a unique, unchangeable soul -even when we understand that sense to be illusory' (Warner, 2002: 3).
Ovid's epic poem consists of many stories concerned with the transmigration of souls and the transformation of bodies -'All things are always changing, but nothing dies' (in Warner, 2002 : 1) -but Pythagoras' vision of interconnectedness and continual flux (stemming from classical and eastern thought and subsequently developed through biology and evolutionary theory) is, as Warner argues, inconsistent with a sense of perfection and of the stabilization or fixity of forms in the poem: 'when Daphne is turned into a laurel tree and a young man called Cygnus becomes a swan . . . the shape into which they shift more fully expresses them and perfects them than their first form' (Warner, 2002: 4) . On the other hand, the punitive aspect of metamorphoses which recurs in Ovid (2002: 9) is underlined in the Christian imagery of Dante's The Divine Comedy. In the Christian imaginary each individual has a unique body and soul joined together by God (Warner and Bakewell, 2002 : 4) so shape-shifting 'becomes a game played by demons' and a symbol of 'sin, terror, torment and loss of selfhood' (Warner and Bakewell, 2002: 4) . Dante's Inferno was among the first re-tellings of Ovid and here, in hell, all metamorphoses are a form of torture and centre on the loss of self and/or species identity. Thus, in the circle of thieves Dante describes how a snake fastens on a sinner, intertwines his multiple limbs about him, and mingles so deeply with his being that his prey ceases to be an entity at all but merges into an 'imagine perversa' (a perverse image). (Warner and Bakewell, 2002: 36) For Dante 'in the afterlife of the damned, morphing utterly reduces identity and integrity' and 'the punished lose their natures as their matter is changed, exchanged, transmuted' (Warner and Bakewell, 2002: 37) . Ovid is thus subjected to Christian morality, a conservative revision, and through artworks such as Botticelli's 'Drawings to Dante' or Bosch's 'Garden of Earthly Delights' the affinity between transformation, damnation and the loss of identity is established (2002: 38) even, for Braidotti, as far as contemporary popular cultural representations of 'monstrous, mutant or hybrid others' (Braidotti, 2002: 5) . So the metaphor of metamorphoses returns the contemporary vision of possible life to the realms of heaven and hell, perfection and punishment, drawing a familiar boundary around the process of transformation and the sanctity of human life.
In artificial life and transgenic engineering, what Jacob refers to as the 'sterile belief' in abstract evolutionary possibility recalls the 'old myth' of metamorphoses which, constrained by both God and Darwin, creationism Kember -Metamorphoses 157 and evolutionism, has nowhere new to go. Evolutionary possibility is effectively negated by the God-given sense that transformation is either transcendent or transgressive. Metamorphoses is a conservative mythology in which nothing actually changes, despite the centrality of change itself. This reading of metamorphoses as a conservative mythology does not seek to preempt Rosi Braidotti's appropriation of it as a more radical one, but rather to highlight the impotence of the evolutionism which it contains and supports and which shadows a quest for metamorphoses as 'becoming versus Being in its classical modes ' (2002: 2) . 8 The conservative metamorphic myth of evolutionary possibility can be traced through the discourses of artificial life and transgenesis and is drawn out here through an analysis of two art works which are regarded as being indicative, though by no means exhaustive, of these fields. The point of exploring the boundary between art and science is to demonstrate the pervasive character of the myth in question and thereby a certain imaginative poverty in contemporary technoscientific culture.
Galápagos
Karl Sims's Galápagos (1997) is described as an interactive media installation which allows users to 'evolve' 3D animated forms. 9 Sims is an established alife artist whose work, including the previous Co-Evolved Virtual Creatures (1992) is part of a lineage which is traced back through Thomas Ray's Tierra (Ray, 1996) and Richard Dawkins's Biomorph (Dawkins, 1991) via William Latham's Evolutionary Art (Todd and Latham, 1992) to John Conway's The Game of Life developed during the 1960s. 10 Like most of this work, Galápagos seeks not to interrogate but to instantiate Darwinian evolution in the computer:
Galápagos is an interactive Darwinian evolution of virtual 'organisms'. Twelve computers simulate the growth and behaviours of a population of abstract animated forms and display them on twelve screens arranged in an arc. The viewers participate in this exhibit by selecting which organisms they find most aesthetically interesting and standing on step sensors in front of those displays. The selected organisms survive, mate, mutate and reproduce. Those not selected are removed, and their computers are inhabited by new offspring from the survivors. The offspring are copies and combinations of their parents, but their genes are altered by random mutations. Sometimes a mutation is favourable, the new organism is more interesting than its ancestors, and is then selected by the viewers. As this evolutionary cycle of reproduction and selection continues, more and more interesting organisms can emerge. (Sims, 2003: 1) The human/machine collaboration here seems to constitute an optimum metamorphic system (with the capacity for emergence or unpredictability) 11 and a means of combining meaning (as aesthetics rather than ethics) 12 and maths. Where 'the visitors provide the aesthetic information by selecting which animated forms are the most interesting', the computers 'provide the 158 Theory, Culture & Society 22(1) ability to simulate genetics, growth, and behaviour of the virtual organisms' with overall surprising results which neither could produce alone (Sims, 2003: 1) . The 'double-barreled software-wetware approach is crucial' (Frauenfelder, 2003: 1) to this digital display of Darwinian evolution which is ultimately both the subject and the object of the installation, dependent on but displacing both humans and machines from the centre stage. What Sims seeks to capture is not a new and improved form of interactivity 13 but a kind of Darwinian hyperspace, the hyperspace of all possible organisms which could/can exist despite the limitations of either human or machine. What is important is that 'the results can potentially surpass what either human or machine could produce alone' (Sims, 2003: 1) . This is an ideal space of evolutionary possibility, uncontaminated by external factors -a direct digital analogue of the isolated Galápagos Islands where Darwin was able to observe 'a rare example of a relatively independent evolutionary process' (Sims, 2003: 2). Sims's ultimate aim is to present, through simulation, evolution 'comparable to the value that Darwin found in the mystical creatures of the Galápagos Islands' (2003: 2).
Sims's mystical creatures 'possess both the variety and the structural similarity of biological organisms' (Unger, 2003: 1) and despite the suggestion of human (aesthetic-eugenic) intervention (Unger, 2003) The subject of this process, the 'I' is in effect indistinguishable from the object. Unger, in combination with the computers, performs the role of simulated evolution which is itself agential over and above not only the software-wetware infrastructure but the rapidly evolving increasingly complex life-forms themselves. These only achieve fixity, perfection or finality retrospectively and through the provision of a genealogy file ('Previous') which contains creatures from previous generations (Sims, 2003) . Alongside the genealogy option is the seemingly ever present option to 'Start Over', to return to the origin of life and cause 'a new evolution to begin from scratch with simple randomly generated creatures'. Also omnipresent in alife programming is the belief, the faith that 'each new evolution will generate results that have never been seen before' (Sims, 2003: 1) . Again though, it is not the results themselves, not the mystical kinds and creatures analogous to Darwin's finches but the capacity to produce them which is paramount. The possible exists here at the expense of the actual. As Unger states, the success of Galápagos 'lies not in its forms, which are ever-changing and unpredictable, but in its architecture -the algorithms, or set of computational rules, that generate those forms' (2003: 2). The real beauty, the real meaning, is the maths and its capacity to mimic a simplified, deterministic relationship between genotype and phenotype -over and over again at very high speed: 'In Galápagos, the process itself is the real art. Sims has created a remarkable allegory of the mechanism that four and a half billion years ago began the most complex design of all -life' (Fifield, 2000: 2) .
In Galápagos, evolution = art = life itself, but this is a simulated evolution, a virtual evolution, thoroughly informationalized and abstracted from the corporeal and material realms of fleshy bodies in local environments. Galápagos installs in an artwork Langton's foundational theme that 'life is a property of form not matter', a 'kind of behaviour, not a kind of stuff ' (1996: 53) . For him, 'just as the "logical form" of a machine can be abstracted from its material substrate, so too . . . may the "logical form" of a [living] organism . . . be separated from its material of construction' (in Jonson, 1999: 47) . So logical form -'information epitomised in the digital code or program' (Jonson, 1999: 48) -is itself 'ontologised as life's disincarnate essence and origin. Concomitantly, material substance is styled as code's inessential, merely accidental or secondary supplement' (Jonson, 1999: 49) . Matter, in other words, is superfluous to life and to the evolution of life. The elision of matter, contested both within the subsequent field of alife and beyond (in philosophy and feminism, for example) nevertheless has, as Jonson points out, 'a distinguished scientific provenance' within molecular biology and its focus on the gene as the fundamental informational agent of life. The information contained in the genetic code or program, as outline in Francis Crick's Central Dogma, determines the development of proteins in the cells of the body, and this information crucially flows only one way. There is, then, as critics of the Central Dogma point out, no acknowledgement of environmental influence -whether intraor extra-cellular -in the development of the organism; no sense of the relation between information and matter in the constitution of life. This vision of the organism and of (a)life is perpetuated in Galápagos, hooked as it is on the eternal, unbounded possibility of logical form, gene agency, evolution and aesthetics without reference to the actual circumstances of the organism, matter, human/machine environments and ethics. The environment of simulated evolution is global, hermetic and homogenized. What matters here is the self-organizing, self-replicating system itself and not its component parts or creatures or kinds. There is no real difference (between one kind and another, between art and instrumentalism), no real distance (in time or space) and only one truly viable organism; the 'simplified evolutionary system' which can be 'observed from start to finish and run multiple times' (Sims, 2003: 2).
The matter-time of the hard geophysical reality of places gives way to this light-time of a virtual reality which modifies the very truth of all durée, thereby provoking, with the time accident, the acceleration of all reality: of things, living beings, socio-cultural phenomena. (Virilio, 2000: 117) The acceleration of all reality yields authority to the machines and those who programme them (Virilio, 2000: 122) , those for whom the primary pursuit would appear to be more aesthetics than ethics, more progress than politics; a 'limit-performance' (Virilio, 2000: 1) at the boundary of art, science and technology. Moreover, the acceleration of all reality leads, for Virilio, inexorably towards inertia:
Every time we introduce an acceleration, not only do we reduce the expanse of the world, but we also sterilize movement and the grandeur of movement by rendering useless the act of the locomotor body. Similarly, we lose the mediating value of 'action' while that of the immediacy of 'interaction' gains in comparison. (Virilio, 2000: 123) In Galápagos, ultimately, nothing evolves but evolution itself; the system speeds along, accelerating evolution in the abstract, producing molecular metamorphoses, strangely familiar forms held within the ultra-Darwinian hyperspace of all possible organisms-as-genes. The animated display of mutating virtual entities in Galápagos re-captures the theme of metamorphoses as a myth of possibility: 'all things are always changing, but nothing dies.' Rather, 'those not selected are removed, and their computers are inhabited by new offspring from the survivors' (Sims, 2002: 1) . Artificial selection by aesthetic criteria substitutes for natural selection by criteria of fitness understood as being contingent on, relative to a given environment. It is by eliding all environmental influence -not just organic matter -that Galápa-gos invests in the possible at the expense of the actual. There is no context for or containment of possibility when even the role of the user and viewer let alone that of human/machine interaction is effaced by the overriding sovereign subject of evolution in the abstract. By being uncontained, abstract evolutionary possibility is simply over-extended -impotent, sterile, mythical in Jacob's senses of the word. It goes nowhere fast and produces nothing new. Every 'organism' is recognizable at least in part -robot-like, crab-like, or with jellyfish fronds -and its evolution is compromised in that it is partly designed or selected by the human eye, by human knowledge and belief. What Ovid's Metamorphoses still tells us is that, faced with apparently unlimited possibility, humans have a tendency to be quite conservative. There is more than a hint of the quest for perfection in the genealogy file and even of the recourse to punishment in the erasure of the relatively un-aesthetic. The organisms themselves, after all, do not matter and for me it is this which underlies the lack of dialogue and imagination in this work. between biology, belief systems, information technology, dialogical interaction, ethics, and the Internet' (Kac, 2002: 1) . Such a wide exploration is focused through/on 'the key element' of the work; an 'artists' gene'. This is a synthetic gene which Kac generated by 'translating a sentence from the biblical book of Genesis into Morse Code 17 and converting Morse Code into DNA base pairs' according to a 'conversion principle' (Kac, 2002: 1) . The sentence in question -'let man have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth' -was chosen 'for what it implies about the dubious notion of divinely sanctioned humanity's supremacy over nature'. Kac seeks to challenge the originary hierarchy of animal/human, nature/culture and the Word of God through a collective interactive process of evolution-as-reinscription:
The Genesis gene was incorporated into bacteria, which were shown in the gallery. Participants on the web could turn on an ultraviolet light in the gallery, causing real, biological mutations in the bacteria. This changed the biblical sentence in the bacteria. The ability to change the sentence is a symbolic gesture; it means that we do not accept its meaning in the form we inherited it, and that new meanings emerge as we seek to change it. (Kac, 2002: 1) Kac places his faith in the transparency of genetic and/as natural language and in the information paradigm in molecular biology. His artwork refers to the Rosetta Stone and its three languages (Greek, demotic script, hieroglyphics) as the 'key to understanding the past', constructing an analogy in the 'triple system of Genesis (natural language, DNA code, binary logic)' as 'the key to understanding the future' (Kac, 2003: 3) . Genesis is clearly premised on the idea that 'biological processes are now writerly and programmable', and its end point is marked by decoding the altered biblical sentence, reading it back in plain English and establishing the 'insights' gained 'into the process of transgenic interbacterial communication' (Kac, 2003: 3) . In fact, at the 'end of the show' of evolutionary reinscription, the original biblical sentence is only slightly undone, replaced not with the emergence of new meaning but with meaninglessness, nonsense.
Richard Doyle (1997) has written engagingly about what might be characterized as the endgame of molecular biology (Kember, 2002) . The discovery of DNA as the secret of life, and particularly the map of the human genome may be said to mark the end of the story of life. Biology is faced with the realization 'that there is nothing more to say' (Doyle, 1997: 20) . There is nothing at the heart of the organism which thus becomes a virtual object upon which a new story of information (as life) is based:
In molecular biology, the end of the grand narrative of life, the 'death' of life, is overcome through a new story of information, in which a sequence of 'bits' is strung together or animated into a coherent whole through the discourse of 'that is all there is', a story of coding without mediation or bodies. (Doyle, 1997: 22) 162 Theory, Culture & Society 22(1) With the advent of the human genome projects, secrets give way to sequences -of nucleic acids which are really 'all there is ' (1997: 22) . Life is displaced from the body and dispersed 'through the narratives and networks that make up the interpretations of genetic databases ' (1997: 24) . Information is a new sublime, matching the unrepresentable vision of life in the 19th century with 'the story of resolution told in higher and higher resolution' -that is 'the continual story that there is nothing more to say ' (1997: 20) . Genetic language succumbs to (a Beckettian) form of nihilism which is only enhanced by revelations of the unexpectedly low number of genes in the human genome and of the consequent increase in complexity or unintelligibility. What appeared, in 1953, to be a clear and legible code, now appears to be, in Steve Jones's terms, somewhat 'baroque'. Jones points out that the current realization that 'the working genes of higher organisms make up only a small proportion of their DNA' came as something of a shock to the founders of molecular biology, and he seems to substantiate the idea that genetic language is not only ambiguous (Kay, 2000) but also largely empty, redundant, even partially extinct and far from revelatory:
Often genes themselves are interrupted by strings of bases that code for nothing. The whole sequence, discontinuous though it may be, is read off into RNA and -with a perversity alien to physics -edited to cut out redundant sections. Even worse, much of the DNA consists of repeats of the same sequence. A series of letters is followed by its mirror image, and then back to the original, thousands of times. Scattered among all this are the corpses of genes that expired long ago, and can be recognised as such only by their similarity to others that still function. The image of genetic material has changed. No longer is DNA a simple set of instructions. Instead, it is a desert of rigidity and waste mitigated by decay. (Jones, 1999: 4) More Beckett than baroque, the death of genetic language informs the beginning of the end (the end of the beginning) of the story of life as told by and against molecular biology at the start of the 21st century. Eduardo Kac's subsequent attempts to add a critique to his original gene-centred project 18 have much the same recuperative effect as attempts to add complexity to genetic determinism (Kember, 2002) . Ultimately the doctrine of DNA prevails and his transgenic art instantiates another molecular metamorphosis where what matters is not the emergent forms or transgenic species, but the species independence of evolution in the abstract. 19 Kac employs two kinds of bacteria in Genesis: a kind which has incorporated a plasmid (extrachromosomal ring of DNA) containing ECFP (Enhanced Cyan Fluorescent Protein) and a kind which has incorporated a plasmid containing EYFP (Enhanced Yellow Fluorescent Protein). ECFP and EYFP are GFP (Green Fluorescent Protein) 'mutants'. Where ECFP bacteria contain the synthetic artists' gene, the EYFP do not. They emit cyan and yellow light respectively when exposed to UV radiation and where mutations occur naturally in the plasmids 'as they make contact with each Kember -Metamorphoses 163 other plasmid conjugal transfer takes place and we start to see colour combinations, possibly giving rise to green bacteria' (Kac, 2003: 2) .
In the gallery, the central display -flanked by the sentence extracted from the book of Genesis on the right wall and the Genesis gene on the left -is a video projection of colour combination and the emergence of green bacteria. Via the projector, the petri dish of bacteria 'shows larger than life' on the centre wall -(extra)planetary in dimension, just like the earth seen from outer space, a symbol for Franklin et al. of globalization (2000) . Both local and remote (web) participants are invited to engage in the process of (global) evolution, by turning the UV light on and off ('In the beginning . . .'). It is important to note, however, that this engagement is limited by Kac to 'monitoring', 'interference' and 'acceleration' of the evolutionary process: 'The energy impact of the UV light on the bacteria is such that it disrupts the DNA sequence in the plasmid, accelerating the mutation rate ' (2003: 1) .
Just prior to the creation of his now infamous 'GFP Bunny' (Alba, 2000) and subsequent to his plans for a green fluorescent dog (GFP K9), Kac has created a global vision of microbial transgenic life which usurps the meaning of life-as-we-have-known-it (Langton, 1996) and which is premised on mixing or miscegenation of categories (natural and artificial) and kinds in order 'to create unique living beings' (Kac, 1999: 289) 20 or new metamorphosed combinations. Within both the emergent art and industry of transgenesis, the utility and ubiquity of GFP in test case transgenic experiments have produced a global vision of life-as-it-could-be (Langton, 1996) , and that vision is green (the colour, conventionally, of aliens). GFP is isolated from the Pacific Northwest jellyfish (Aequoren Victoria) and is, as Kac describes it 'species independent', needing no additional proteins or substrates for green light emission. Consequently, 'GFP has been successfully expressed in several host organisms and cells such as E. Coli, yeast, and mammalian, insect, fish and plant cells' (Kac, 1999: 290) . So, at the outset of the global transgenic experiment, human kind is faced with the perhaps unsettlingly egalitarian prospect that 'every living thing that moves upon the earth' -including 'man' -has the potential to be green where green is not a pure colour, type, race or species. The nervousness which attends such a prospect is displayed in the inevitable jokes, puns and quips which attend each new green arrival -whether actual or possible. Where GFP K9 ('or "G", as I affectionately call it') will 'literally have a colourful personality' (Kac, 1999: 290) , ANDi the transgenic monkey produced by the Oregan Regional Primate Research Centre (in October 2000) and in whom the GFP failed to take, was 'not quite a glowing success' (in Meek, 2001: 1) . Jokes, as Haraway points out in her analysis of a primate research lab (1989) , are a means of disavowing the flip-side of humanism in science: the sadism, racism, or sexism. They tell 'us' that mixing and miscegenation, like the failure rates and suffering induced in transgenic experiments, is in fact, species-specific and reassure us that 'we' will never be (made to be) 'green'. Human(ist) self and species identity is thus recuperated in both the art and industry of transgenesis (a truly -conservatively -metamorphic praxis) and Kac's sentimental gestures towards kinship with his green dog/bunny -centring as they do on the 'domestication and social integration [my emphasis] of transgenic animals ' (1999: 292) -are both hollow and an inadequate response to the increasing instrumentalization of life in the burgeoning transgenic industry of 'pharming'. Kac accepts, even embraces, the inevitability of transgenesis -'it is clear that transgenesis will be an integral part of our existence in the future' -seeming to cancel out the danger of the farm with the promise of the expanded family and the progress of the (human) species:
In the future we will have foreign genetic material in us as today we have mechanical and electronic implants. In other words, we will be transgenic. As the concept of species based on breeding barriers is undone through genetic engineering, the very notion of what it means to be human is at stake. However, this does not constitute an ontological crisis. To be human will mean that the human genome is not a limitation, but our starting point. (Kac, 1999b: 293) Conclusion Genesis, like Galápagos, participates in the metamorphic myth of possibility where nothing metamorphoses but metamorphoses itself. Metamorphoses is consistent with the theory of evolution where what is at stake is the mutation and transformation of both individual organism and species. Contemporary biotechnology, and particularly artificial life and transgenesis, at once denaturalize (accelerate) and re-naturalize this process of transformation, insisting on its status as evolution not becoming but eliding all of the material constraints within which evolution has operated and continues to operate (cells or computers, bodies or machines, communities or networks and so on). This is at the heart of Jacob's critique of modern Darwinism and his own attempts to retrieve the dialogue between the possible and the actual. There is corporeality in Genesis but no actuality; the mutation and evolution of the artist's gene are 'species independent', autonomous and unbounded by the organisms and their environment including the human participants who ultimately only 'monitor', 'interfere' or at most 'accelerate' it. The absence of the actual is ultimately what accounts for the conservatism, the humanism of Kac's vision. By over-extending evolutionary possibility he retains the spectre of the transgressive 'imagine perversa', the monster, the alien (the little green man?) which effectively precludes the transformation in human self and species identity which biotechnology promises or threatens. Unconstrained evolution in the abstract, the possible without the actual, as critics such as Jacob have made clear, changes nothing, let alone the order of things. Rather, it ensures the survival of God and Darwin in an unimaginative information loop (gene -Word, Wordgene) which has surely had its day.
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himself did and which is strongly associated with Richard Dawkins's doctrine of the selfish gene (1976) and the development of sociobiology. 4. They are certainly not, as Jacob uses them, part of scholastic philosophy, but rather of his critique of modern Darwinism and the 'sterile belief' in evolution. There is thus no direct connection between philosophical concepts of the virtual and the actual (Deleuze, 1994; Lévy, 1998 ) and Jacob's concepts of the possible and the actual. Indeed, they may be said to describe two parallel trajectories within contemporary culture -becoming and evolution -which may be too easily obscured, and which this article, with its focus on evolutionary possibility seeks to clarify. The discourse of evolution, unlike that of becoming, is inherently naturalized and Jacob's call for a dialogue between the possible and the actual is used here to effect a de-renaturalization of evolutionary possibility in contemporary art and science.
Even though Jacob's use of the terms does not map onto Deleuzian philosophical uses, it is interesting to consider Deleuze's concept of the possible as that which is not real (where the virtual is real in the sense that the past and memory are real) but which may be actual (where the virtual may not be): 'In other words, there are several contemporary (actual) possibilities of which some may be realised in the future' (Hardt, in Shields, 2003: 25 ). Jacob's 'dialogue' between the possible and the actual allows for this change (in the real), and it is this change in the real which is lacking in the sci-art discussed here (but which need not be). Simply put, in Jacob's critique of evolution in modern Darwinism, the possible is too far removed from the actual to lead to change. Rather, it leads nowhere except to abstract evolutionary possibility itself: 'the possible is that which does not really exist, but could to various extents. At one extreme is the absolutely abstract, and an ideal which, properly speaking, has no existence, but rather only possibility' (Shields, 2003: 25) . 5. There is also the play of myth and science in Jacob's essay of that title. Where 'in some respects at least' myths and science share a function of providing representations of the world and of the forces that govern it; of fixing 'the limits of what is considered possible ' (1982: 9) ; of turning chaos into order (1982: 11); of allowing space for the imagination and for the invention of 'a possible world, or a small piece of a possible world', the similarities end there.
Having constructed what it considers not only as the best world but as the only possible one, it [myth] easily fits reality into its scheme . . . For scientific thought, in contrast, imagination is only one aspect of the game. At every step, it has to meet with criticism and experimentation in order to determine what might reflect reality and what is mere wishful thinking. (Jacob, 1982: 12) 6. Metamorphing: Transformation in Science, Art and Mythology, curated by Marina Warner and Sarah Bakewell was at the London Science Museum, 4 October 2002 -16 February 2003 . Warner and Bakewell here maintain a distinction between nature and culture which is now widely questioned and which is certainly problematized in the areas addressed in this article. 8. It is not my intention to take issue with Braidotti's argument or to engage in detail with it here. Notions of evolution, with which I am concerned, do not map onto those of becoming, with which Braidotti is concerned, although they certainly exist in a productive tension. My point is precisely to clarify, highlight and critique the existence of (abstract) evolutionism which informs and is informed by the current myth of metamorphoses and which in my view constrains but does not necessarily negate its association with a materialist theory of becoming. 9. Galápagos was installed at the ICC in Tokyo from 1997 to 2000, and was exhibited at the DeCordova Museum in Lincoln, Massachusetts, in 1999. 10. The whole field of artificial life was inspired by the work of John von Neumann (in the 1950s) and John Conway (in the 1960s) on cellular automata (CAs). This aimed to simulate biological processes of self-replication, evolution and emergence on a grid system or check board on which squares functioned as cells (Levy, 1992) . The emergence of both stable and periodic configurations on Conway's The Game of Life grid, including the much-cited 'glider', led him to claim that in principle it could support the emergence of all recognizable animal forms and an infinite number of new ones. He also claimed that on a large enough scale there would be 'genuinely' living configurations, 'whatever reasonable definition' of living was applied (in Levy, 1992: 58) . Among researchers and enthusiasts, CAs are deemed 'sufficiently complex to develop an entire universe as sophisticated as the one in which we live ' (1992: 58) . This sense of boundless 'creative' (Dawkins, 1991) if not creationist possibility persists in the development of alife software such as Richard Dawkins's Biomorph (Dawkins, 1991) and Thomas Ray's Tierra (Ray, 1996) , and by means of the development of genetic algorithms (GAs) which are computer programs designed to replicate, mutate and evolve (Risan, 1996; Mitchell and Forrest, 1997) . 11. Emergence is one of the key criteria for life outlined in the discourse of artificial life. It is linked with the concept of bottom-up or self-organization (Boden, 1996) as well as evolution and may be said to describe the capacity of the system (organic/informational) to develop behaviours or characteristics beyond those of its component parts. N. Katherine Hayles distinguishes between first-order emergence which refers to 'any behaviour or property that cannot be found in a system's individual components' and second-order emergence which signifies the appearance of a behaviour which stimulates the development of adaptive behaviours (1999: 9). Second-order emergence, then, involves the evolution of the ability to evolve and is one of the goals of alife. It is also what characterizes Galápagos as a metamorphic system. 12. In his seminal paper on artificial life (Boden, 1996) Langton gestured at ethical questions which remained largely dormant until a retrospective in 2001 (Bedau et al., 2001) . Here, four main ethical issues are indicated: (1) the sanctity of the biosphere; (2) the sanctity of human life; (3) responsibility towards new forms of artificial life; and (4) the risk entailed in exploring the possibilities of alife. It is interesting that all these issues are similarly indicated in the discourse of genetics (the link is explicit in Bedau et al., 2001) , suggesting that alife and genetics are informed by a single, fundamentally humanist bioethics which functions, if it functions, somewhat retrospectively as a brake on evolutionary possibility. In Galápa-gos there is no brake, no dialogue between the possible and the actual which, for Jacob is indicative of science (versus modern Darwinism), politics, ethics and the imagination. Without this, anything (and nothing) is possible, including the 'artificial selection' (Dawkins, 1991) of organisms based on purely aesthetic criteria. 13. In Information Arts, Stephen Wilson outlines the interactive and creative possibilities of alife and genetic art. Alife techniques 'can enable artists to create
